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NOTES ON THESE PAPERS

25X1A Proposed ey

1. It seem pretty clear to me that this is the origin of the "Global Survey" reorganization. At least, the reorganization followed pretty much these lines with a few exceptions such as that there was never any "Special Assistant." Apparently, someone was impressed with the power of WE's complaints and decided the Branch was right.

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April 21,04

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- 2. I doubt very much if ever saw (or has ever seen) these papers. If he had, there would certainly have been a rebuttal. I wonder if persons concerned were not a little afraid to face what that rebuttal would have contained.
- 3. It is quite evident from these papers that (a) the WE people were mad clear through their feelings had been bitterly hurt and that they were organizing a conspiracy against an enemy; (b) that ((a)) this, was the real basis of their attack and the reason for so much argumentum ad hominem and petitio principii; and (c) that far more real than the alleged mutilation of their "expert" intelligence is the morale problem (which in turn may have been what really impressed those who adopted the new plan.)
- 4. Aside from the obvious need of a reviewing authority, the basic fallacy in the argument arises from the fact that their "experts" were neither experts nor the persons of learning and judgment they are made out to be. I can only illustrate. The Italian "expert" mentioned as having been overriden by in the 25X1A

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judgment regarding intelligence estimates than your neighbor's pet  $25 \times 1C$ for publicacat. The sort of thing that tion was superficial  $m{\zeta}$  nonsense for the most part which no selfrespecting intelligence agency could think of forwarding to, say,  $$25{\rm X}1{\rm A}$$ endeavors had, as WE avows, passed the Secretary of State. 25X1A the hands of the Branch Chief and the editor both of whom had had much experience in their fields whatever he might have done as editor for the Navy during the war - was useless as an editor in ORE as events 25X1A proved (even got rid of him in that capacity), and time and again that he could not perceive good from bad in his experts' work. Despite WE's allegations about how right it had 25X1C WE was reasoning that, been in the matter because of the patriarchial nature of French and Italian family life, the only kind of government that suited either country was would win in Italy and DeGaulle in dictatorship 1C Hence, 25X1A was, of course, a flash in the pan, and DeGaulle France. still glowers at the French. I wish a copy of 25X1A was dealing with. isted. Then you could see what was utterly ignorant and incom-5. WE implies that petent when all they are really saying is that he was tactless. 25X1A is a master of (Note what is said about

6. To the historian, WE's ingornance of how the Intelligence Staff came into being is laughable. I am not sure whether this was

really ignorance or deliberate twisting of the facts.

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- The morale problem was a real one. The actual question, though, was the right way to solve it. In fine, it amounted to this: each branch had hired people who were flattered (or flattered themselves) into thinking themselves the last word on all matters relating to their countries. They saw ORE sending current and other intelligence to the very highest quarters of the Government. To be the author of a piece so distributed was naturally looked on as an honor. Each analyst undoubtedly worked very hard indeed on, say, an article for the weekly and was naturally grieved if it was rejected or altered.\* Hence the morale problem. In later years, all Branches had "inter-branch" dailies, weeklies, monthlies, maybe yearlies which circulated within ORE and to a few specialists outside. These consumed much time that could have been better used. Candid people in the Branches sometimes would admit that the real reason for these was to insure that each analyst could see something he had written in some kind of print. It seems to me that there might be other ways of making analysts happy besides printing bad copy lest they complain of being slighted.
- 8. We's categorical statement that intelligence should go straight from the analyst to the consumer is very interesting to me and gives another reasons for believing that this paper was taken to higher authority behind back. In public meeting

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\*NOTE: You are undoubtedly familiar with the student who can't see why he didn't get an "A" on his paper because he worked very hard on it.

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in ORE, I do not believe any Branch Chief would have admitted in so many words that this was his view. I might add my belief that one reason why the Branch Chiefs never got rid of the Intelligence Staff (they always had the same thing under different names) and why the vaunted IFB mentioned in this document came to naught was that in the last analysis, they would have not dared send their material forward without an intervening review. Although they did not realize quite how bad their product was, they would have been most loath to take full responsibility for it.

- 9. The NOTE scotch taped to cover of folder is post script to the big WE memorandum. It is significant that the Branch did 25X1A not see fit to forward, with this note, exactly what had written, with LIM's comments. Without such a submission, this NOTE 25X1A as usual, quoted out of context. It is interesting in this connection to note how the Branch not only chose its own quotations but misinterpreted what it quoted, either unintentionally or maliciously. Said that since there was no hurry about 25X1A the paper (the events then predicted have still to come to pass) that the study be allowed to hang fire. For some reasons or other, WE took this to mean that Montague thought the paper out of date!
  - 10. Somehow characteristic of this whole thing is the page setting forth WE's unsubstantiated opinion that "intelligence should pass directly from the experts who produce it to 'those who need to know!" under the heading "Discussion of Relevant Intelligence

Theory";
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- 11. "...testy college professors correcting freshmen (note mis-25X1A spelling characteristic of freshmen) compositions." This was 25X1A
  - tactlessness, but it is damn difficult, when you are receiving what amount to C- freshman compositions from people who are supposed to be college graduates, not to be a little testy at times.

    CIA should have invested money wisely by sending some of the "highly competent men" concerned through a course in Freshman English.
  - 12. Suggested title for chapter on this. \*\* "The Knife in the Back."